I've been engaged in a couple of discussions on several sites about the current state of Iraq, and what steps the US can take to help 'ensure victory.' The ultimate question of what constitutes 'victory' needs much clearer definition, of course. We must admit that some definitions of 'victory' are not achievable, or depend on a multitude of factors completely outside of our control. Even acknowledging that, however, there are specific steps that I think can help us quite a bit.

1) Any and all rebuilding projects MUST EMPLOY LOCAL WORKERS. This is not optional. Unemployment in Iraq is currently astronomical, and the legions of unemployed and disaffected are ripe for recruitment by nationalist insurgents. Putting THEM to work in the rebuilding of the country is critical, but American companies are going so far as to importing third-world laborers from Sierra Leone. Helping Sierra Leone is great, but keeping Iraqis employed while their country is being rebuilt is better.

2) Allow laws banning all forms of torture to pass. Open up military prisons in Iraq, Cuba, and other nations to Red Cross inspectors. We are not simply fighting a military conflict: we are trying to convince an entire nation of people we are on their side, even though we have betrayed them in the past. Whatever benefits we believe are gained by mistreatment of prisoners, torture, or 'torture light' are offset by the tremendous damage done to our reputation in the Mideast.

3) Decide which is more important: a pro-American Iraq willing to stand against religious extremism, or a free and democratic Iraq. One of the reasons we backed Sunni-ruled Iraq through the 80s and early 90s was its strong opposition to the Shiite religious extremists in Iran. Iraq was a secular Arab state, arguably one of our best friends in the region until Kuwait. In toppling the Sunni power structure and installing a democracy, we've effectively put the Shiites in charge. This is good, democratically speaking, because the Shiites have a considerable majority. This is bad strategically speaking, because the rest of the Middle East didn't want Iran's influence to spread. Either did we.

4) Plan for civil war. If we're tremendously lucky, it might not happen. Osama Bin Laden might turn himself in tomorrow and announce a change of heart, too. Sadly, we must plan for what is likely rather than what is desired. Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites have been at each others' throats for decades. We've shaken the bottle and taken the cork off. The Iraqi military force that *we are currently training* is mostly composed of existing tribal and regional militia members. It's currently doubtful that they will side with a central national government over their pre-existing tribal and ethnic groups if push comes to shove. What will we do if the central government breaks down? What will we do if the Kurds go ahead with their plans to negotiate separate treaties with other countries, and begin to function as their own autonimous region? They did during Sadaam's reign in the 90's.

5) Establish clear criteria by which Iraqi military and civil defense preparedness can be measured. 'They're in the fight' is not a metric, it's a platitude. We had these clear measurements going for a while, but they were canned when progress was slow. If things are not moving as fast as we'd like, it's better to KNOW it and figure out what's wrong than pretend things are better.

This is not a comprehensive plan. This is not a blueprint for victory. But I believe they're clear things we can do to improve our chances.